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INSULATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURES FROM THE CHILLING EFFECT OF
DEFAMATION LITIGATION
Ruth A. Kennedy
Abstract: The threat of defamation liability may undermine the push to encourage private
employers to establish internal grievance procedures for handling sexual harassment
complaints. Courts have recognized two defenses to defamation claims arising out of
employers' sexual harassment investigations: the qualified privilege and the intracorporate
immunity rule. Neither of these defenses adequately balances the need to insulate grievance
procedures against the desire to protect the reputation of the employee accused of harassment.
This Comment proposes the adoption of a new grievance procedure privilege which would
ensure the integrity of grievance procedures while maximizing the protection afforded an
accused employee.
The specter of defamation suits threatens to undermine efforts to
encourage private employers to comply with sexual harassment laws.
Courts have sought to reduce sexual harassment by recognizing it as
discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.1
Thus, Title VII places a duty on employers to prevent and remedy
harassment within the workplace, and seeks to foster the creation of
internal grievance procedures for handling harassment allegations.
Internal grievance procedures are a vital mechanism for ensuring private
compliance with discrimination laws. Yet, both employees who lodge
complaints in the workplace and employers who investigate such
complaints risk becoming defendants in long and expensive defamation
suits.
Defamation law must accommodate the competing interests of the
employee who lodges a complaint ("the complaining employee"),2 the
employer who investigates a charge of harassment ("the employer'), 3
and the employee accused of harassment ("the accused employee').
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 1988). Federal courts interpret Title VII to prohibit sexual
harassment. See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
2. For ease of narrative, this Comment uses the pronoun "she" when referring to the complaining
employee, and "he" when referring to the accused employee. Although most workplace harassment
is of women by men, the genders of the complaining employee and the accused employee may vary.
See The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 258,276 n.l (1986).
3. The accused employee sometimes also sues the supervisor in charge of investigating the sexual
harassment claim. Often in such cases the plaintiff uses the theory of respondeat superior to try and
hold the employer liable for the investigating employee's statements. See Lawson v. Boeing Co., 58
Wash. App. 261,266, 792 P.2d 545, 549 (1990).
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Accommodation of these varied interests under a single defense is,
however, difficult. Courts currently recognize two defenses to
defamation suits arising out of private employment disputes:4 the
qualified privilege and the intracorporate immunity rule. Neither of
these defenses is adequate. The qualified privilege fails to prevent the
threat of a defamation lawsuit from deterring an employee who wishes to
lodge a grievance with her employer. The intracorporate immunity rule,
on the other hand, too narrowly circumscribes the protection afforded an
accused employee.
This Comment proposes that courts adopt a new grievance procedure
privilege which incorporates into a single defense the best components of
the existing defenses. This new hybrid defense would have as its
primary goal the protection of internal grievance procedures for handling
harassment allegations. By acting in accordance with an established
grievance procedure, both the employer and the complaining employee
could limit their exposure to defamation liability. The proposed
privilege also would accommodate the needs of the accused employee by
defining the scope of protected speech as narrowly as possible within the
limitations imposed by the need for an effective grievance procedure.
I. TITLE VII AND PRIVATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Sexual harassment in the workplace violates a strong national policy
prohibiting employment discrimination.5 Since 1976, federal courts have
recognized that sexual harassment constitutes impermissible
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 Once
recognized as a form of Title VII discrimination, sexual harassment
complaints come within the jurisdiction of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").7 The EEOC handles complaints of
4. Suits involving public employers and employees are outside the sope of this discussion.
5. Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 8,10, 844 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1314 (1990); Lawson, 58 Wash. App. at 269, 792 P.2-3 at 550.
6. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In 1986 the Supreme Court eliminated any
lingering doubts that both "quid pro quo" complaints, in which sexual conduct is directly linked to
the grant or denial of economic benefits, and "hostile work environment" complaints, in which the
conduct creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment, constitute impermissible
discrimination under Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
7. Congress created the EEOC in order to administer and enforce Title VII. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-4 (West 1988). In 1980, the EEOC issued its guidelines on ss.xual harassment. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (1992).
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people who believe themselves to be victims of Title VII discrimination.8
When an employee files a complaint with the EEOC, the agency must
notify the employer and commence an investigation.9
In addition to EEOC enforcement, private compliance and
enforcement procedures figure prominently in the scheme to eliminate
sexual harassment. The EEOC and the federal courts recognize that Title
VII requires an employer to investigate and act upon an employee's
allegations of sexual harassment." When determining an employer's
liability for harassment, courts look favorably upon the fact that an
employer has an established procedure for handling sexual harassment
complaints." Commentators thus advise employers that, in order to
diminish their exposure to liability, they should have a written sexual
harassment policy which defines the company's procedures for enforcing
compliance with anti-discrimination laws. 2
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT DEFAMATION SUITS
In recent years, some employees investigated for sexual harassment
have started to bring defamation claims." 'While accused employees
usually sue their employers,' 4 they have also begun to sue the
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1992); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (West 1988).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (West 1988).
10. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that an employer is
liable for harassment if it failed to take appropriate corrective measures); 29 C.F.Rt § 1604.1 1(d)-(f)
(1992).
11. See Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ill. 1990),
aff'd, 957 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992); Strickland v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 693 F. Supp. 403, 406 (E.D.
Va. 1988), aff'd, 846 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (finding that while the presence of a grievance procedure policy did not
automatically insulate an employer from liability, the presence of a policy was clearly relevant to the
issue of employer liability).
12. See, e.g., Stuart H. Bompey, Practical Problems in Investigating Sexual Harassment Claims,
in Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 426 PLI/Lit 141, 184-86 (1992); Jeanne C. Miller,
Employee Dating, Sexual Harassment, and the Employment of Related Employees, in Handling
Corporate Employment Problems, 410 PLI/Lit 119, 139-43 (1991); American Bar Association,
Employment Discrimination Law 157 (David A. Cathcart & R. Lawrence Ashe, Jr. eds., 1989).
13. See cases cited infra notes 14 -15. This rise in sexual harassment-related defamation suits is
part of a dramatic increase in the number of workplace defamation claims filed over the past decade.
See Ann M. Barry, Comment, Defamation in the Workplace: The Impact of Increasing Employer
Liability, 72 Marq. L. Rev. 264 (1989); John B. Lewis et al., Defamation and the Workplace: A
Survey of the Law and ProposalsforReform, 54 Mo. L. Rev. 797 (1989).
14. E.g., Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987); Scherer v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 766 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1991), af'd, 975 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1992);
Stockley v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 687 F. Supp. 764, (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Adler v. American Standard
Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd in part, 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987); Ekokotu v.
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complaining employees."5 Both employers and complaining employees
have invoked the protection of the qualified privilege and the
intracorporate immunity rule when trying to defend against the
defamation suit.
A. Elements ofDefamation
Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander. Libel is
defined as written defamation, while slander is defamation
communicated orally. 6 A communication is defamatory if it harms
someone's reputation so as to lower him in the estimation of the
community, or to deter people from associating with him. 7 In order to
establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning him and
that the defendant published the statement to a third party18
B. Defamation Defenses in the Workplace
Defamation law has long recognized the need tc protect the free flow
of information in order to advance important societal interests. 9 The
courts, therefore, developed a structure of immunities and privileges
designed to encourage and protect certain speech.2" These defamation
defenses rest upon the idea that when a defendant's otherwise actionable
Pizza Hut, Inc., 422 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 1992 Ga. Lexis 970 (Ga. Nov. 13,
1992).
15. E.g., Miller v. Servicemaster by Rees, 851 P.2d 143 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Lovelace v. Long
John Silver's, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Lawson v. Boeing Co., 58 Wash. App.
261,792 P.2d 545 (1990).
16. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984).
The distinction between libel and slander can have a bearing on the damages which a plaintiff must
establish in order to recover. Id. § 112, at 786. For a discussion of how the distinction affects
workplace defamation suits, see Barry, supra note 13, at 268-70.
17. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1976); see also Keeton et al., supra note 16, § 11, at
774.
18. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1976). The plaintiff also must establish that the
statement was actionable irrespective of special damages or that tie publication caused special
damages. Id. In addition to establishing the common law elements, a plaintiff must consider the
evolving constitutional law regarding defamation suits. For a review of the role of constitutional law
in defamation suits in the employment context, see Richard J. Larson, Defamation at the Workplace:
Employers Beware, 5 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 45, 52-55 (1987), and Lewis ot al., supra note 13, 816-17.
19. Keeton et al., supra note 16, § 114, at 815. For details regarding the type of societal interests
deemed important enough to warrant protection by a defamation privilege, see id. § 115, at 824-25.
20. Id. § 114, at 815.
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communication seeks to advance an important societal interest, the law
should protect that communication, even at the expense of a defamed
individual.2' In addition to generally available defenses such as truth,
courts apply two defenses specifically to workplace defamation claims: 2
the qualified privilege and the intracorporate immunity rule.
1. The Qualified Privilege
The qualified privilege" protects statements made in an attempt to
further important societal interests.24 Whether a situation warrants
application of the privilege is a question of law to be determined by the
court.2s Once the privilege is established, the defendant loses its
protection only by acting in a manner inconsistent with the interest which
gave rise to the privilege.26 The burden is on the plaintiff to show that
the defendant abused the privilege.27
The plaintiff can establish abuse by showing that the defendant either
acted with malice or published the statement excessively.28  The
necessary standard for malice varies among states. Some jurisdictions
apply the actual malice standard,29 while others require proof of common
21. Id.
22. In cases involving federal officials charged with defamation for statements made in the course
of sexual harassment investigations a third defense of absolute immunity has been recognized. See,
e.g., Henley v. Rusiecki, 1987 WL 10296 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1987); Arruda v. Stanzione, 1990 WL
17149 (D.R.I. Feb. 21, 1990). Defenses, such as truth, which are generally recognized in all
defamation suits, are also applicable to workplace defamation suits. See, e.g., Gillson v. State Dep't
of Natural Resources, 492 N.W.2d 835 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
23. Also referred to as a conditional privilege. E.g., Lawson v. Boeing Co., 58 Wash. App. 261,
267 n.13, 792 P.2d 545, 549 n.13 (1990); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 593 (1976).
24. See Keeton et al., supra note 16, § 115, at 824.
25. See, e.g., Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380,386-87 (5th Cir. 1987);
Miller v. Servicemaster by Rees, 851 P.2d 143, 145 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); see also Keeton et al.,
supra note 16, § 115, at 835; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 619 (1976). Courts have recognized a
qualified privilege in a variety of situations including when the publication is for the protection of
the defendant's own legitimate interests or the publication is used to protect legitimate interests of a
third party. Keeten et al., supra note 16, § 115, at 825-30.
26. Keeton et al., supra note 16, § 115, at 832-36. The issue does go to thejury if the facts which
gave rise to the privilege are in dispute. Id.
27. E.g., Garzlano, 818 F.2d at 388; Tipps Tool Co. v. Holifield, 67 So. 2d 609, 618 (Miss. 1953);
Daywalt v. Montgomery Hosp., 573 A.2d 1116, 1119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); see also Keeton et al.,
supra note 16, § 115, at 835.
28. Garziano, 818 F.2d at 388; Miller, 851 P.2d at 145; see also Keeton et al., supra note 16, §
115, at 832-35.
29. To establish actual malice, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the
statement's falsity or acted with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement. See, e.g., Prysak v.
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law malice.30 The test for abuse of the privilege through excess
publication is whether the defendant communicated the allegedly
defamatory statement to persons who did not share the interest or duty
which gave rise to the privilege.3 ' The issue of whether a privilege has
been abused is usually for the trier of fact; the court, however, can
resolve the issue if only one conclusion can be drawn from the facts. 2
2. The Intracorporate Immunity Rule
Several jurisdictions observe the intracorporate immunity rule, which
holds that communications within a corporation do not constitute
publication to a third party, and thus are not actionable under defamation
law.33 Unlike the qualified privilege, proof of malice cannot destroy this
defense. 4  To qualify for the rule's protection, the defendant need only
prove that the communication in question was made in the regular course
of business.35 Once a defendant has satisfied thds condition, courts
dismiss defamation claims on pre-trial motions.
R.L. Polk Co., 483 N.W.2d 629, 636 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Lawson v. Boeing Co., 58 Wash. App.
261,267, 792 P.2d 545, 549 (1990).
30. See, e.g., Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 727 (Va. 1985), cert. denied 472 U.S. 1032,
and cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 (1985); see also Keeton et al., supra note 16, § 115, at 833-35. The
definition of common law malice varies among jurisdictions. Some jtuisdictions require a showing
of negligence, while others require proof of ill will or spite. See Lewis ct al., supra note 13, at 827.
31. E.g., Stockley v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc, 687 F. Supp. 764,769-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
32. E.g., Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 790 (Alaska 1989); Olsson v.
Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 571 N.E.2d 585, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Soentgen v. Quain &
Ramstad Clinic, P.C., 467 N.W.2d 73,79 (N.D. 1991).
33. E.g., Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Wisconsin
law), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983); ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. McLaney, 420 S.E.2d 610 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1992), cert. denied, 1992 Ga Lexis 756 (Ga Sept. 11, 1992); Hetlesen v. Knaus Truck Lines,
Inc., 370 S.W.2d 341 (Mo. 1963). For a more complete list, see Jane M. Draper, Annotation,
Defamation: Publication by Intracorporate Communication of Employee's Evaluation, 47 A.L.R.
4th 674 (1986). Several theories have been proposed to justify this rule, the most common of which
is the single entity theory, which views the corporation as a single unit formed from the individual
identities of its agents. See Note, Libel and Slander-Intracoporate Communications as
Publication to Third Persons-Luttrell v. United Telephone System, 33 Kan. L. Rev. 759, 762-63
(1985).
34. Note, supra note 33, at 905.
35. E.g., Hellesen, 370 S.W.2d at 344.
36. See, e.g., Ekokotu v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 422 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 1992
Ga Lexis 970 (Ga. Nov. 13, 1992); Hellesen, 370 S.W.2d at 344.
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A growing number of jurisdictions have abandoned the intracorporate
immunity rule.37 Several cogent reasons have been put forth to support
abrogating the rule. 8 Perhaps the most compelling is the recognition that
damage to a corporate employee's reputation within the workplace can
be just as devastating as the injury caused by the spreading of defamation
in the wider community. 9
Im. EXISTING PROTECTIONS INADEQUATELY INSULATE
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES FROM THE CHILLING IMPACT
OF DEFAMATION LIABILITY
The threat of defamation claims has important implications for the
efficacy of Title VII. Employers' internal grievance procedures play an
important role in Title VII enforcement. ° If employers hesitate to fully
investigate complaints or employees are afraid to notify employers of
potential problems, then private enforcement will be undermined. To
avoid such a result, employers and complaining employees must be able
to limit their exposure to defamation litigation by following proper
procedures. If they have followed correct procedures any resulting
defamation suit should be dismissed on summary judgment.
A. The Chilling Effects of Defamation Suits
Fear of the economic repercussions of a defamation suit may chill
employers' efforts to enforce Title VII. Defending defamation suits can
be extremely expensive; some estimate that legal costs average between
$140,000 and $250,000 for each suit.4 ' If the claim goes to trial,
defendants incur the full cost of defense whether or not they prevail on
the merits. The burden of high legal costs is coupled with fear of large
jury awards.42 Commentators already have noted that the threat of
37. See Luttrell v. United Tel. Sys., Inc., 683 P.2d 1292 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984), affid, 695 P.2d
1279 (Kan. 1985); Bander v. Metropolition Life Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 595 (Mass. 1943); Michaelson
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 NAV.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd in part, 479
N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992). For a more detailed list, see Draper, supra note 33, at 674; see also Daven
G. Lowhurst, Comment, Intra-Corporate Communications; Sufficient Publication for Defamation or
Mere Corporate Blabbing, 7 Comm./nt. L.J. 647,662 (1989).
38. See, e.g., Note, supra note 33, at 765-69; Lowhurst, supra note 37, at 676.
39. See Luttrell, 683 P.2d at 1294.
40. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
41. See Barry, supra note 13, at 265 n.9.
42. Verdicts of more than one million dollars are not unusual in workplace defamation suits, and
some verdicts have reached as much as six million dollars. See Lewis et al., supra note 13, at 798.
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increasing defamation liability may cause employers to change their
business practices.43 If potential liability causes employers to restrict the
flow of information necessary for complete investigation of a harassment
complaint, efforts at private compliance will be hampered.'
Encouraging complaining employees to use internal grievance
procedures is difficult enough without the threat of defamation suits.
Employees who believe they are suffering harassment tend to remain
silent out of fear of reprisal or in order to avoid embarrassment. 4' The
additional threat of the economic and emotional burden of defending
against a defamation suit can only further discourage employees from
lodging complaints.
Congress sought to address the deterrent effect of fear when it drafted
Title VII. Section 704(a) of Title VII makes retaliation for lodging a
discrimination complaint an actionable offense."6 The EEOC has
recognized that the threat of a defamation suit is just the type of reprisal
that can stifle complaints, 47 and has expressed concern that lawsuits
against complaining employees may seriously impede the fight to
eliminate employment discrimination 8
The most direct means of preventing defamation suits from stifling
complaints and deterring employers from initiating a full investigation is
to ensure that suits arising out of good faith efforts at confronting
harassment will be dismissed on summary judgment. Early resolution of
such claims will lessen the economic impact on both employers and
complaining employees. It will also help prevent complaining
employees from being deterred by the emotional burden and potential
43. The increasing threat of defamation liability has caused some employers to use only neutral
language when responding to another employer's request for a recommendation. Larson, supra note
18, at 60-61; Barry, supra note 13, at 300-02.
44. Despite the liability that may arise from an employer's failure to frlly investigate a harassment
claim, it seems likely that the threat of defamation suits can deter fill investigation. After all,
evidence suggests that defamation law impacts employers' willingness to give negative references
despite the growing threat of negligent reference claims. See Larson, supra note 18, at 60-61; Barry,
supra note 13, at 300-02. Furthermore, the law should avoid placing employers in the untenable
position of risking defamation litigation by complying with Title VII.
45. See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs Legal Definitions, 13 Harv.
Women's L.J. 35, 52 n.56 (1990). One study indicates that as many as 60 percent of victims ignore
sexual harassment, believing that complaining will only cause them further harm. Id.
46. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 20000e-3(a) (West 1988).
47. EEOC Decision No. 74-77, 1974 WL 3847 (E.E.O.C.) (Jan. 18, 1974).
48. Id. at 5-6. As a result of its concern, the EEOC held that any statements made by a
complaining employee to the EEOC are absolutely privileged and that filing a defamation suit in
response to an employee's EEOC complaint constitutes impermissible retaliation in violation of
Section 704(a) of Title VII. Id. at 6.
242
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embarrassment of a full trial on the merits. As one court noted, summary
judgment is a blunt instrument, but it is also the preferable resolution of a
defamation claim if the speech at issue is to be encouraged.49 Since early
resolution of a defamation suit can help prevent the chilling of
harassment complaints and investigations, the efficacy of a defense can
be evaluated in terms of the defendant's ability to obtain summary
judgment after having made a good faith use of grievance procedures.
B. The Inadequacy of the Qualified Privilege in Sexual Harassment
Cases
While the qualified privilege is effective in some respects, it does not
fully protect the integrity of sexual harassment grievance procedures.
The qualified privilege balances well the interests of the employer and
those of the accused employee. The privilege offers the accused
employee some protection by encouraging employers to make sure that
complaints are adequately investigated in order to determine the truth or
falsity of the harassment allegations. At the same time, the privilege
protects the employer by ensuring that if an employer makes a thorough
and good faith investigation of a complaint, any defamation claims will
be dismissed on summary judgment. Unfortunately, however, under the
privilege a complaining employee who lodges a good faith grievance
using correct procedures cannot feel secure that a defamation suit against
her will be dismissed on summary judgment.
1. Employers and Accused Employees Under the Qualified Privilege
The qualified privilege sufficiently insulates employers from
defamation claims, so that they can conduct reasonable investigations of
harassment complaints without fear of liability. Many courts recognize
that the qualified privilege attaches to statements made as part of sexual
harassment investigations. 0 This privilege is a bar to liability unless the
49. Dragisich v. Mesabi Daily News, 1993 WL 19665, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1993)
(concluding that summary judgment protects a person's First Amendment right to full and free
expression of speech concerning the government's conduct).
50. See, e.g., Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 1987);
Stockley v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 687 F. Supp. 764, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Hanly v. Riverside
Methodist Hosps., 603 N.E.2d 1126, 1134 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Lawson v. Boeing Co., 58 Wash.
App. 262, 266-67, 792 P.2d 545, 549 (1990). The qualified privilege is the most often asserted
defense in workplace defamation suits. John J. Fossett, Defamation in the Work Place: The New
Workhorse in Termination Litigation, 15 N. Ky. L. Rev. 93, 105 (1988). The courts have uniformly
extended the privilege to employers who published statements in the ordinary course of business. Id.
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employer abuses it by acting out of malice, or by excessively publishing
the allegedly defamatory statement. 1 Establishing abuse is difficult,
however, and in most cases in which an employer asserts this defense,
the claim against the employer is dismissed on summary judgment. 2
The reason why defense summary judgment motions are so often
successful lies in the difficulty of establishing that the employer abused
the qualified privilege. 3 Courts take a stringent approach to the malice
standard, requiring that the accused employee produce affirmative proof
of malice.' Courts have rejected plaintiffs' attempts to meet this burden
by making allegations which are easily pled but do not support a clear
inference of malice. One court held, for example, that evidence of an
employer's concern regarding potential Title VII liability to the
complaining employee was insufficient to create a genuine issue
regarding malice." Courts likewise have rejected the argument that
failure to interview every potentially exculpatory witness constitutes
adequate proof of malice.56 As a result, few, if any, accused employees
have been able to establish an issue of fact regarding malice when the
harassment investigation was at least facially reasonable.
Despite the difficulty of surviving summary judgment, the possible
loss of the privilege through proof of malice offers the accused employee
some potentially important protection. Proof that an employer published
allegedly defamatory statements after conducting an inadequate
investigation of the harassment charges can sometimes be sufficient to
create a genuine issue of fact regarding malice.5" At least two courts
51. See, e.g., Garziano, 818 F.2d at 388; Stockley, 687 F. Supp. at 769-70; Miller v.
Servicemaster by Rees, 851 P.2d 143, 145 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
52. See, e.g., Scherer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 766 F. Supp. 593, 606 (N.D. Ill. 1991), afid, 975
F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1992); Stockley, 687 F. Supp. at 774; Miller, 851 P.2d at 146; Hanly, 603 N.E.2d
at 1132.
53. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
54. See Garziano, 818 F.2d at 389; see generally Stockley, 687 F. Supp. at 770 (holding that a
plaintiff must have more than an articulable theory of malice). There is disagreement regarding the
level of malice a plaintiff must prove. Some courts have required proof of actual malice. See
Garziano, 818 F.2d at 388; Miller, 851 P.2d at 145; Lawson, 58 Wash. App. at 267,792 P.2d at 549.
At least one court has required proof of ill will or spite, that is common law malice. See Hanly, 603
N.E.2d at 1132.
55. Stockley, 687 F. Supp. at 770-71; see also Garziano, 818 F.2d at 389-90 (holding that proof
of an earlier dispute with the employer over sick leave and lunch breaks was not sufficient proof of
malice).
56. Stockley, 687 F. Supp. at 772; Garziano, 818 F.2d at 389.
57. See cases cited supra notes 50 and 52.
58. The courts which have found that proof of an inadequate investigation creates a question of
fact regarding whether the defendant acted with malice were purporting to apply an actual malice
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have found that evidence of an inadequate investigation can include
proof that the employer failed to interview the accused employee.5 9 One
of these courts also found proof of malice in the fact that the employer
never interviewed someone who witnessed the incident in question.
60
Another court found proof that an employer had an ulterior motive for
making a defamatory publication combined with evidence of an
inadequate investigation was sufficient to sustain a finding of malice.6 '
If more courts begin to recognize that evidence of a seriously deficient
investigation is sufficient to create an issue of fact regarding whether an
employer acted with malice, then the qualified privilege will offer the
accused employee important protection.
The threat of losing the privilege's protection and having to face a full
trial on the merits would encourage employers to define and publicize
procedures for conducting thorough sexual harassment investigations. A
well-run investigation should help protect the reputation of an employee
who has been falsely accused. Because the employers can take measures
to reduce their risks, the qualified privilege encourages them to fine-tune
their grievance procedures rather than abandon their efforts at private
enforcement of discrimination laws.
In addition to the protection afforded by the malice standard, the
possibility that the employer will lose the protection of the privilege by
excessive publication also safeguards the accused employee's interests.
Fear of liability based on excess publication encourages employers to
versus a common law malice standard. Babb v. Minder, 806 F.2d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 1986); Kuwik
v. Starmark Star Mktg. and Admin., Inc., 597 N.E.2d 251, 255-56 (111. App. Ct. 1992), affd, 1993
11. Lexis 56 (ill. Jul. 22, 1993); White v. American Postal Workers Union, 579 S.W.2d 671, 674
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979). Cf Dominguez v. Babcock, 696 P.2d 338, 342 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), affd,
727 P.2d 362 (Colo. 1986) (holding that the failure to investigate, without more, does not create a
genuine issue of fact regarding actual malice).
In cases involving public figure plaintiffs or media defendants, the Supreme Court has held that
under the First Amendment proof of an inadequate investigation, without more, does not constitute
actual malice. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In cases involving private
plaintiffs and non-media defendants, however, the First Amendment does not require states to apply
the 'actual malice' standard as delineated by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Lewis et al., supra note
13, at 816-17. Therefore, while the holdings of courts like Babb, Kuwik, and White may be read as
interpreting the requirements of'actual malice' differently than the Supreme Court in Gertz, such an
interpretation would pose no constitutional problem. (It is interesting to note that on remand the
Gertz court found support for the determination that the defendant had acted with actual malice in
the fact that the defendant had conducted an inadequate investigation. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
680 F.2d 527, 539 n.19 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983)).
59. Babb, 806 F.2d at 756; White, 579 S.W.2d at 674.
60. Babb, 806 F.2d at 756.
61. White, 579 S.W.2d at 674.
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control the scope of publication in order to ensure that only those who
have a legitimate reason for being privy to the allegations learn of them.
The less pervasive the publication, the less damage that can be inflicted
on an accused employee's reputation.
Courts have rejected attempts to infer excessive publication from the
mere fact that persons outside the circle of those investigating a
harassment complaint know of the allegations.62 Instead, courts require
affirmative proof of an employer's responsiblity for excessive
publication.63 As with malice, the necessity for affirmative proof
protects the integrity of internal grievance procedures by allowing
employers to limit their exposure to liability by training their personnel.
2. Complaining Employees and Accused Employees Under the
Qualified Privilege
While the qualified privilege encourages employers to develop well-
defined grievance procedures, the threat of defamation liability still
deters employees from lodging harassment complaints. By filing the
right affidavit, an accused employee can avoid summary judgment in a
suit against a complaining employee. As a result, a complaining
employee cannot predict whether utilizing internal grievance procedures
will lead to a defamation trial.
Whether or not a defamation case arising out of a harassment
complaint will go to trial depends in large part on how the accused
employee argues the facts. Any complaint of sexual harassment contains
two components: an allegation that certain event-3 occurred, and an
assertion that such events constituted sexual harassment. If the accused
employee files a defamation claim, it is possible that he will admit to the
underlying events but contend that they did not constitute harassment.64
Disputing the legal conclusion of harassment alone is insufficient to
overcome the privilege because misinterpreting events does not support a
62. See Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, .-93 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that an employer is not liable for rumors that are not directly linked to its own publication of the
harassment allegations); Stockley v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 687 F. Supp. 764, 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that evidence of an office "grapevine" is not proof of unprivileged communications by an
employer); Scherer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 766 F. Supp. 593, 607 (N.D. II1. 1991) (holding that
there is no employer liability for communication which could not reasonably be anticipated, such as
when a sealed letter is unexpectedly opened by someone other than the addressee or when rumors
have spread), affid, 975 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1992).
63. E.g., Garziano, 818 F.2d at 389.
64. See Miller v. Servicemaster by Rees, 851 P.2d 143, 146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
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clear inference of malice.65 If, however, the accused employee denies the
underlying events, his denial will often be sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether the complaining employee acted
with malice.
The problem faced by complaining employees was articulated by the
court in Lawson v. Boeing Co.66 Because a complaining employee
possesses first hand knowledge of the events which are said to constitute
harassment, the veracity of these factual allegations has a bearing on
whether the complaining employee abused the qualified privilege. If the
events never happened, then the complaining employee made a
knowingly false accusation when she asserted that the events occurred. 67
A knowingly false statement constitutes malice.68  Noting that at
summary judgment a court must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, the Lawson court held that an
affidavit by the accused employee denying the events alleged in the
harassment complaint was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact regarding malice. 69  The complaining employee's motion for
summary judgment was, therefore, denied.70
The Lawson court's reasoning has the potential to dissuade employees
from alerting their employers to potential problems. It is not unusual for
the events which are said to have constituted harassment to have
occurred in private.71 If there were no witnesses to corroborate the
complaining employee's testimony, the issue will be reduced to a
"swearing match" between the complaining and accused employees.
Even though it may appear that a trial is necessary when malice is so
inextricably linked to an evaluation of the parties' credibility, allowing
65. Lambert v. Morehouse, 68 Wash. App. 500, 507, 843 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1993); Miller, 851
P.2d at 145.
66. 58 Wash. App. 262,792 P.2d 545 (1990).
67. Id. at 267-68, 792 P.2d at 549.
68. Id. at 268, 792 P.2d at 549. A knowingly false statement constitutes both actual malice and
common law malice. Asserting a knowingly false statement is acting with reckless disregard for the
truth. See supra note 29. Asserting such a statement is also indicative of ill-will, spite, or
negligence. See supra note 30.
69. See Lawson, 58 Wash. App. at 269,792 P.2d at 550.
70. In a later opinion, this same court granted a complaining employee's motion for summary
judgment. Lambert v. Morehouse, 68 Wash. App. 500, 843 P.2d 1116 (1993). The Lambert court
upheld the reasoning of Lawson. Id. at 506-07, 843 P.2d at 1119. It found, however, that by
submitting an affidavit stating, "I did not sexually harass anyone," the plaintiff had denied only the
legal implications of the incident. Id. at 507, 843 P.2d at 1119. The court found that such a
conclusory statement was insufficient to survive summary judgment. Id. at 507, 843 P.2d at 1120.
71. See, e.g., Henley v. Rusiecki, 1987 WL 10296 (N.D. III. Apr. 27, 1987); Garziano v. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380,382 (5th Cir. 1987).
Washington Law Review
such cases to go to trial will deter even those employees who would file
complaints in good faith from using grievance procedures.
Assume for a moment that an employee is repeatedly subjected to
unwanted sexual advances by a coworker. Assume also that these
overtures take place in private. When considering whether to tell her
employer, this employee will be unable to predict the potential
consequences of filing a complaint. It is possible that if the accused
employee files a defamation suit, he will admit to the underlying events
and she will be able to obtain summary judgment. IF, however, avoiding
a defamation trial is important to her, she will have to trust that the
person she believes is harassing her will not deny the events. Given that
fear of reprisal and embarrassment have already been shown to deter
employees from informing their employers of harassment,72 there is good
reason to believe that employees in this situation will be unwilling to use
internal grievance procedures.
Employees in such situations will be better off skipping over internal
grievance procedures and taking their complaints directly to the EEOC.73
When an aggrieved employee lodges a complaint with the EEOC, she is
guaranteed absolute immunity from defamation liab.lity.74 This absolute
immunity acts as a complete bar to recovery in a defamation suit brought
by an accused employee. Once the court determines that the immunity
applies, no further inquiry is made into the motivation and circumstances
behind publication.'
If complaining employees were to follow this route, efforts to foster
private enforcement mechanisms would necessarily be undermined. Yet,
undermining internal procedures in favor of official complaints does not
result in greater protection for the accused employee's reputation. When
the EEOC receives a complaint, it will notify the employer of the
allegations and the agency will conduct an investigation.76 Complaints to
the EEOC, therefore, result in publication of the charges within the
workplace community. There is no reason to believe that the accused
72. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
73. The complaining employee also can take her complaint to the appropriate state administrative
agency.
74. See, e.g., Paros v. Hoemako Hosp., 681 P.2d 918 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Saini v. Cleveland
Pneumatic Co., 1987 WL 11098 (Ohio Ct. App. May 14, 1987); Hurst v. Farmer, 40 Wash. App.
116, 697 P.2d 280 (1985). Absolute immunity is also granted for statements made to a state
administrative agency. See, e.g., Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 265 Cal. Rptr. 814, 822 (Cal. CL App. 1990).
75. See, e.g., Wrenn v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 474 N.E.2d 1201
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984); see also cases cited supra note 74.
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (West 1988).
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employee's reputation is damaged less when an employer learns of an
allegation from the EEOC than when the allegation comes directly from
the complaining employee.
The best way to insulate an accused employee's reputation from the
damage of a defamatory statement is not to force the complaining
employee to go the EEOC, but to encourage her to limit the scope of her
publication within the workplace. If proof of excessive publication were
the only way to overcome the qualified privilege, then a complaining
employee would both be encouraged to use internal grievance procedures
and encouraged to limit the scope of her publication. To create an issue
of material fact, the accused employee needs affirmative proof of the
complaining employee's responsibility for excess publication.77
Therefore, if excess publication is defined as publication to persons other
than those responsible for handling harassment complaints, a
complaining employee could limit her exposure to liability by strictly
adhering to the reporting practices laid out in the grievance procedure
policy. Meanwhile, by limiting the scope of publication, the potential
damage to the accused employee's reputation would be reduced. Under
the qualified privilege, however, the excessive publication standard for
abuse is wedded to the more problematic malice standard. As a result,
from the perspective of the complaining employee, the entire defense is
fatally flawed.
C. The Inadequacies of the Intracorporate Immunity Rule in Sexual
Harassment Cases
The problems with the intracorporate immunity rule are almost the
exact opposite of those encountered under the qualified privilege. The
rule balances well the interests of the complaining employee with those
of the accused employee. The rule, however, too broadly defines the
protection afforded the employer, leaving the accused employee with less
protection than is appropriate.
1. Employers and Accused Employees Under the Intracorporate
Immunity Rule
The intracorporate immunity rule effectively encourages employers to
enforce anti-discrimination laws. While few courts have addressed
whether the rule applies to statements made during the course of a sexual
77. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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harassment investigation," courts have held uniformly that it protects
statements made in an attempt to resolve personnel problems. 9 The only
question for a court to resolve when determining whether the rule applies
is whether or not statements were made as part of an official
investigation."0 Once the rule is deemed applicable, it acts as a complete
bar to recovery."
Although the rule fosters private compliance by insulating
investigations from the impact of defamation liability, the rule
unnecessarily limits the protection given an accused employee. The rule
does pressure employers to limit the scope of publication by shielding
only statements made as part of an investigation. This pressure offers
protection similar to that afforded by the excessive publication prong of
the qualified privilege. However, under the intracorporate immunity rule,
the court will not inquire into the issue of malice. 2 Thus, even if an
accused employee has affirmative proof of the investigation's
inadequacy, the charge will be dismissed on a pre-trial motion as long as
the statements were part of an investigation.
Such a harsh standard is unnecessary. As cases involving the
qualified privilege have demonstrated, it is possible to require employers
to monitor their internal grievance procedures to ensure that
investigations are thorough without compromising the integrity of the
grievance procedures.8 3  Given the importance of an individual's
reputation within the workplace, it makes little sense to deny the accused
employee a possible avenue of protection.
78. See generally Ekokotu v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 422 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied,
1992 Ga. Lexis 970 (Ga. Nov. 13, 1992); Lovelace v. Long John Silver's Inc., 841 S.W.2d 682
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
79. See, e.g., King v. Schaeffer, 154 S.E.2d 819 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967), affid, 155 S.E.2d 815
(1967); Rogeau v. Firestone Tire Co., 274 So. 2d 454 (La. Ct. App. 1973). For a more detailed list,
see Draper, supra note 33.
80. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Ekokotu, 422 S.E.2d at 904-05.
82. Id. at 905.
83. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
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2. Complaining Employees and Accused Employees Under the
Intracorporate Immunity Rule
The intracorporate immunity rule prevents potential defamation
liability from deterring employees who wish to lodge complaints.'
Under the rule a complaining employee can limit her exposure to
defamation litigation by lodging her grievance only with the appropriate
personnel.85 By affording her protection similar to that which she would
receive if she went directly to the EEOC, the rule encourages a
complaining employee to use internal grievance procedures.
The rule also offers the accused employee some protection. If a
complaining employee makes a potentially defamatory accusation to
someone who does not have a duty to resolve a personnel problem, the
protection of the rule is lost.86 The rule thus serves to control the amount
of potential damage to the accused employee's reputation by limiting the
scope of publication.
IV. THE PROPOSAL: A NEW BIFURCATED GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURE PRIVILEGE
A new grievance procedure privilege is necessary in order to
encourage private compliance with harassment laws without needlessly
limiting the protection given to an accused employee. This grievance
procedure privilege would meld the advantages offered by both the
qualified privilege and the intracorporate immunity rule. This new
privilege would be conditional and could be lost through abuse. The
defense would, however, bifurcate the standard for abuse, applying one
standard to complaining employees and another to employers.
The privilege's primary goal would be to protect the integrity of
internal grievance procedures. It would achieve this goal by allowing
both employers and complaining employees to limit their exposure to
defamation liability by following proper procedures. In order to ensure
such control, the privilege would offer the employer a partial immunity
84. The rule's ability to protect complaints is, of course, contingent on the court's recognition of
the rule's applicability to complaining employees. Given that some courts have stated that the rule
applies only to corporate officers, there is some question whether the rule will be extended uniformly
to complaining employees. See, e.g., Snodgrass v. Headco Indus., Inc., 640 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982). The logic of the rule, however, favors such an extension. See Lovelace v. Long John
Silver's Inc., 841 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
85. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
86. See generally Ekokotu, 422 S.E.2d at 904-05.
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modeled after the qualified privilege. It would offer the complaining
employee a more complete immunity comparable to that which is
afforded by the intracorporate immunity rule.
The employer's partial immunity would allow the employer to reduce
its exposure to defamation liability. This partial immunity would shield
statements from liability unless the accused employee could prove that
the privilege was lost through malice or excessive publication. As with
the qualified privilege, the accused employee would bear the burden of
proof of establishing abuse. As a result, employers could feel confident
that the accused employee could not overcome the privilege merely by
pleading allegations of its abuse.87 To avoid summary judgment, the
accused employee would have to produce affirmative evidence of the
employer's abuse of its privilege.
Under the new privilege, the accused employee could establish a
genuine issue of material fact by producing evidence that the
investigation was wholly inadequate. Using the adequacy of the
investigation as a basis for overcoming the privilege would encourage
employers to train their personnel well and to monitor their grievance
procedures to guard against abuse. This push towards more thorough
investigation would help protect the accused employee from unjust
damage to his reputation. At the same time, by giving employers a
viable mechanism for decreasing their exposure to defamation liability,
this new privilege would prevent the fear of defamation liability from
paralyzing private efforts to enforce sexual harassment laws.
The scope of protected publication under the new privilege would be
limited to those who share responsibility for investigating an allegation.
If an employer established a reasonable grievance procedure, then courts
would use the procedure to evaluate whether there was excess
publication. An employer would thus be able to minimize its exposure to
defamation liability by establishing well-defined procedures and
ensuring that its employees were sensitive to the confidential nature of an
investigation. If investigatory personnel limited the scope of publication,
the potential damage to the accused employee's reputation would be
reduced.
The more complete immunity for complainin~g employees would
encourage them to utilize internal grievance procedures. The privilege as
applied to complaining employees only could be lcst through excessive
publication. The new privilege thus would avoid the dangers associated
87. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text
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with trying to apply the malice standard to complaining employees.88
The sole test for abuse of the complaining employee's privilege would be
whether she properly contained the scope of her publication. In essence
the new privilege would provide the complaining employee with the
same sort of protection she would have received had she lodged her
complaint with the EEOC instead of with her employer.
If there were a well-publicized grievance procedure which designated
the manner for lodging a complaint, then the proper scope of a
complaining employee's publication would be measured against that
policy. If no such policy existed, the court would examine whether the
complaining employee had lodged her grievance with an appropriate
supervising employee. The privilege thus would provide a complaining
employee with a means of reducing her exposure to defamation liability.
It also would offer the accused employee some protection by limiting the
number of third parties to whom a complaining employee could safely
communicate potentially defamatory accusations.
While the new privilege would offer the accused employee substantial
protection, it could not guarantee that an accused employee would not be
defamed. Under the privilege, there is no way to challenge accusations
made by a complaining employee to the designated supervisory
personnel even when these statements were made with full knowledge of
their falsity. The privilege would attempt to contain the damage done by
such statements by limiting the scope of publication and compelling
employers to instigate thorough investigations. It could not, however,
fully insulate the accused employee from the statement's damaging
impact. The grievance procedure privilege, like all defamation
privileges, rests upon the idea that otherwise actionable speech should'be
shielded from liability in order to advance some important societal
interest.89 The EEOC and the federal courts have determined that private
employers' internal grievance procedures are an effective tool for
fighting sexual harassment.9" This proposed grievance procedure
privilege would ensure that defamation law does not act as a
counterweight to Title VII by impeding the effective implementation of
private mechanisms for enforcing the prohibition on sexual harassment.
88. See supra note 66-75 and accompanying text.
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
